This is the third part of the BCS Bash series. For part one, click here. For part two, click here.
We all come to a point in life when we have to make a decision, but the best choice is not clear. However, after we make and carry out that decision, we are able to judge if the decision we made. The Bowl Alliance decided to include the Big East, Big 8, Southwest, Atlantic Coast, and Southeastern conferences and to exclude the Western Athletic, Mid-America, and Big West conferences. The Bowl Alliance decided to have the participants in its three bowl games be the conference champions of the five included conferences, plus one at-large team. The BCS made these same decisions three years later. (Note: The Big 8 and Southwest conferences merged in 1996 to form the Big 12. For clarity, I will refer only to the Big 12 for the rest of this article.)
The declared intent was still to match number one and number two in a bowl game, but the actions of the organizers sent a clear message that participating in the elite bowls was for conference champions. If you are a champion you have automatic access. If you are not a champion get in line and hope your name is called. The automatic access, however, was not granted to all conference champions because not all conference champions were viewed as equal. Champions of the SEC, ACC, Big East, and Big 12 were in a higher class than the other conference champions. They were given automatic qualifying status because they were "extra special." The other conference champions were merely mediocre.
This is America and we have the freedom of speech, so there is nothing illegal with anyone making that statement. In America you are also innocent until proven guilty, so let’s take this to the judge.
Court is now in session. Charges have come against the Bowl Alliance/BCS for unjustly limiting the automatic qualifying status for conference champions to the ACC, SEC, Big East, Big 10, Big 12, and Pac-10. The prosecution argues that for anyone to be a conference champion, they earn that distinction through their performance on the field of play. If these six conference champions are so superior to the other conference champions, their performance on the field of play will reflect that.
Exhibit one is the win-loss record and winning percentage before bowl games for the conference champions for the automatic qualifying conferences dating back to 1996.
Year....ACC....SEC....Big East..Big 10...Big 12...Pac-10
1996....11-0...11-1......10-1.........10-1.....8-4......11-0
1997....10-1...11-1.......9-3.........11-0....12-0......10-1
1998....11-1...12-0.......8-3.........10-1....11-2......10-1
1999....11-0...10-2......11-0..........9-2....11-1.......8-3
2000....10-1....9-3......11-0.........10-1....10-2......10-1
2001....10-1....9-3......11-0.........10-1....10-2......10-1
2002.....9-4...12-1......12-0.........13-0....11-2......10-2
2003....10-2...12-1......10-2.........10-2....11-3......11-1
2004....10-2...12-0.......8-3..........9-2....12-0......12-0
2005.....8-4...10-2......10-1.........10-1....12-0......12-0
2006....11-2...12-1......11-1.........12-0....11-2......10-2
2007....11-2...11-2......10-2.........11-1....11-2......10-2
2008.....9-4...12-1......11-2.........11-1....12-1......11-1
2009....11-2...13-0......12-0.........10-2....13-0......10-2
Total 143-26..157-17..143-19....154-17..157-19...145-17
Win % 0.846...0.902...0.882.....0.901...0.892....0.895
Relevance: The ACC champion had the lowest winning percentage (0.846) among the conference champions awarded automatic qualification to a BCS bowl. If this winning percentage is significantly higher than that of the conference champions not awarded automatic qualification to a BCS bowl, then the BCS is justified for excluding those other conferences.
Exhibit two is another table that shows the win-loss record and winning percentage before bowl games for the conference champions for the non-automatic qualifying conferences dating back to 1996.
Year...MWC*...WAC**...MAC...Conf. USA
1996...13-1.......8-3........8-3.........8-3
1997...10-2.......6-5.......10-2.........8-3
1998...11-1.......8-3.......11-1........11-0
1999....8-3.......8-4.......12-0.........8-3
2000....9-2......10-1........7-5.........9-2
2001...12-1.......7-4........9-2........10-2
2002...10-3......11-1.......10-2.........9-2
2003....9-2......12-1.......12-1.........9-3
2004...11-0......11-0........9-3........10-1
2005...10-1.......9-3........7-5.........8-4
2006...10-2......12-0........9-4........10-3
2007...10-2......12-0........8-5........10-3
2008...12-0......12-0........8-5.........9-4
2009...12-0......13-0.......11-2.........9-4
Total 147-20...139-25......131-40.... 128-37
Win%..0.880...0.847.......0.766......0.775
* = The Mountain West Conference (MWC) did not exist prior to the 1999 season. The data used for 1996-1998 are the records of the Western Athletic Conference (WAC) champion since the MWC members competed in that conference at that time and all WAC champions during that time are now members of the MWC.
** = Most of the teams comprising the WAC today were members of the Big West Conference from 1996-1998, so the records of the Big West Champion was used for those years.
(Note: The Sun Belt Conference did not exist prior to 2001, so for lack of data, the Sun Belt Conference was not used in this comparison.)
Relevance: On the field of play, both the MWC and the WAC champions, over a 14 year period, have sustained better on the field performance than the ACC champion. The WAC champion’s winning percentage was 0.001 better, and the MWC champion’s winning percentage was 0.034 better. It is also important to point out that the MWC champion’s wining percentage was only 0.002 less than the Big East champion. The performance on the field of play by the WAC and the MWC champions has exceeded that of the ACC. The MWC champion is even on par with the Big East champion.
Exhibit three is the results of the “BCS Busters” against teams from automatic qualifying conferences.
2004: Utah 35, Pittsburgh 7 (Pittsburgh was the Big East Champion)
2006: Boise State 43, Oklahoma 42 (Oklahoma was the Big 12 Champion)
2007: Georgia 41, Hawaii 10
2008: Utah 31, Alabama 17
Overall Record: 3-1 (2-0 versus automatic qualifying conference champions)
Relevance: On the field of play, non-automatic qualifying conference champions have won 75% of the time they have played in BCS bowl games against teams from AQ conferences, and 100% of the time these non-automatic qualifying conference champions have played automatic qualifying champions.
While Hawaii lost to Georgia by 31 points that does not hurt my case. Teams from conferences with AQ status have lost by 31 points or more in Bowl Alliance or BCS games on six occasions.
Florida lost to Nebraska by 38 points in 1995
Florida State lost to Florida by 32 points in 1996
Notre Dame lost to Oregon State by 32 points in 2000
Maryland lost to Florida by 33 points in 2001
Oklahoma lost to USC by 36 points in 2004
Illinois lost to USC by 32 points in 2007
The BCS’s decision to exclude cannot be justified by Hawaii’s blowout loss since it is not the only time that a BCS game has had such an outcome. In fact, Hawaii did not have the greatest losing margin of all teams in BCS games in 2007. On the other side of the coin, Utah won in 2004 by 28 points, which begs the question, “Why would such a superior conference champion lose so lopsidedly?”
Exhibit four is the changes in conference make up. Since the Bowl Alliance formed in 1995, the composition of the Big 8, the ACC and the Big East have all changed. The Big 8 added teams from the SWC and the ACC swiped teams from the Big East. The Big East, however, reached into the pile of leftovers (teams not in a conference granted automatic qualifying status) and added three teams. Since the Big East added teams, three out of five years one of the former outsiders won the conference.
Relevance: While the Big East conducted research to determine the best candidates to add to the conference, the Big East did not need authorization by the BCS. The BCS did not conduct its own analysis of performance on the field of play and conclude who were the three most qualified teams in college football for membership in the exclusive BCS circle. The precedent established in 1995 changed the rules for conference expansion. The ACC added teams from a fellow AQ conference, but if a conference was going to reach outside the AQ boundaries, then the BCS should have to approve the move.
Furthermore, the immediate success of these new Big East members shows that, on the field of play, teams from conferences without an automatic qualifying conference champion are NOT inferior to the teams in conferences with an automatic qualifying conference champion.
Exhibit five is that the expressed purpose of the Bowl Alliance, which the BCS continued, was to create a system that would match the number one and number two ranked teams in the same bowl game.
Relevance: On two occasions (Nebraska in 2001 and Oklahoma in 2003) teams who were not conference champions played for the national championship. To play for the national championship, a team must be ranked either number one or number two. Since teams who were not conference champions qualified for the national championship game, the BCS showed that automatic qualifying status for conference champions was not necessary to accomplish its intent. Therefore, one or more of the parties involved in creating the Bowl Alliance and the BCS were working to protect special interests by creating the automatic qualifying status for a limited number of conferences in college football.
Closing Arguments: The defendant will, undoubtedly, attempt to counter my evidence with the strength of schedule for teams from the conferences with automatic qualifying champions. I rebut that argument by reiterating what was covered yesterday regarding “overall conference strength.” This notion of “strength of schedule” is a false perception born out of misconceptions that have, unfortunately, corrupted all forms of rankings and ratings for college football. When the issue is automatic qualifying status for conference champions, the only evidence that matters is performance on the field.
Specific to exhibit three, the defendant might rebut by incorporating regular season head-to-head competition of teams from conferences with automatic qualifying status versus teams from conferences without automatic qualifying status. That is irrelevant evidence. First, any head-to-head comparison should be between conference champions in the year that both teams were conference champions. Second, head-to-head competition is not a criterion used for selection of any team to the BCS bowls. USC and Notre Dame have both played in BCS bowls in the same year, regardless of the results on the field of play in the regular season. The same can be said for Florida and Florida State. Even in 2008, USC embarrassed Ohio State during the season, but both played in BCS bowls. The tables in exhibits one and two include all regular season games. Any head-to-head competitions that occurred are a part of those records. Bringing in regular season head-to-head competition is another bad cover up. It would be like lying: once you lie, you have to use another lie to cover it up. Regular season head-to-head competition would be using an injustice to cover up the original injustice.
The evidence I have presented clearly shows that two conference champions that don’t have automatic qualifying status have performed equally on the field of play to the conference champions that do have automatic qualifying status.
When we find out that we made a bad decision, we take corrective action. The BCS needs to take corrective action. Like most corrective action, it will hurt the wrongdoer. Fortunately in this case, the corrective action is simple. For now, though, we have had enough for one day. Come back tomorrow for The Solution.
Part 4: The Solution: It's About Conference Champions
Sources:
www.shrpsports.com/cf/
www.bcsfootball.org/news/story?id=4809942
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